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MULTIPLE AND RANKED GENERALIZED OTHERS IN 
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONIST THEORY 
WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR DIFFERENCE AND INEQUALITY 
ABSTRACT 
Mead and Blumer propose the important role of the generalized other but this 
concept has been largely overlooked in later symbolic interactionist theories and research. 
This has implications for the social psychology of difference and inequality, especially 
since the generalized other can be a powerful tool as W. E. B. DuBois' concept of"dual 
consciousness" points out. Blumer' s "sense of group position" has been used to focus on 
difference, but this term usually requires a structural leap. To re-emphasized the 
generalized other in symbolic interactionist theory, we make five points: (1) the social 
construction of identity involves multiple-selves based on multiple-generalized others; (2) 
this involves both internalization or externalization of views; (3) generalized others may be 
positive or negative, and generalized others are ranked in terms of importance to the self; 
( 4) generalized others are framed by one's self in that some acquaintances are emphasized 
and others ignored; and ( 5) difference and sense of group position springs from these 
rankings. 
Keywords: multiple generalized others; symbolic interactionism; social constructionism; 
difference. 
Symbolic interactionist theories have long dealt with difference usillg the self in 
· · · h hn" d d d" · h th I · vs of difference do mteractrnn wit race, et 1c an gen er 1vers1ty; owever, ese exp anat10 
not always employ the very tenets of symbolic interactionism (SI) itself. In P1°st SI work, the 
"generalized other" (GO) is often overlooked and the "self' dominates theoretical and empirical 
discussion. Further, multiple generalized others are generally not recognized- More recent 
research on multiple GOs combines internal self-conversations with literary or discourse 
theories-Burr (2009) on dialogism, Slocum-Bradley (2009) and Gillespie fllld Cornish (2009) 
on discourse, and Archer (2003, 2010) on reflexivity-but they are not directly concerned with 
difference. Holdsworth and Morgan (2007) come the closest to Mead by adding fluidity to the 
GO, but they give brief mention of different others. But the bypassing oftve GO in symbolic 
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. study of the self world level, one must at least compare two concept10ns of "others," but the 
. •'othering" and alone does not make this apparent. Schwalbe et al. (2000) clearly focus on 
inequality from the "outside-in" (i.e., externalization) with an SI format, a,:,d we attempt to 
complement their work using the basic theory of SI with the addition of~ "inside-out" (i.e., 
internalization) approach that balances attention to ones' many selves witbJ. corresponding 
multiple generalized others. And once multiple GOs are recognized, they c;::;an be studied, 
d ank d d · d th · thr · • • .,-,ne' s place in the compare , r e , an viewe as sympa et1c or eaterung m assessmg .,.__, 
world of diversity. 
. . _ ,Lplaining the social Ranked multiple "generalized others" can be used as a means of e,--
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approaches to social interaction come close to explaining difference by using a nearly structural 
"sense of group position." And by difference, we use a wide focus that can be constructed around 
families, gang or team members to larger groupings of class, race and gender (i.e., any in- or out-
group ). In showing how group difference is constructed and transferred between people using 
"the generalized other," we emphasize multiple generalized others" connected to multiple selves. 
In this way difference comes from being positively perceived by one generalized other and 
negatively ( or less positively) viewed by another. 
We proceed in five steps: (1) showing how the "generalized other" has been initially 
described and then swept aside in most SI theories, (2) showing how theories of difference have 
been constructed in SI theory without explicitly using the GO, (3) making five points on 
reemphasizing the GO in the construction of the self, ( 4) connecting the GO and difference, and 
(5) providing an overall model of multiple GOs in SL 
The Generalized Other in Traditional Symbolic Interactionism 
Mead's theory of the self clearly centers on the concepts of the "I," the "me," and the 
GO, and how they form the self in interaction with other individuals and groups. The "me" 
represents the socialized aspect of the self that makes presentations to the outside world where 
people observe the "me." The "I" reviews and objectifies the "me" as others reflect their 
performance evaluations via the looking glass self, and it represents the sometimes unpredictable 
and creative part of the self that is tactical and decisive (Lewis, 1979). Mead defined the GO as 
"the organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self' 
(1934:154).1 For Mead, the GO is constructed from many different occurrences of taking the 
perspective of the other, which can be seen as a social network of acquaintances and friends. 
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The GO provides the opportunity for reflexivity when the actor takes him or herself not 
only as a subject but as an object as well (Mead, 1934). It is through the GO that the community 
exercises control over its individual members. These attitudes toward the other then reflexively 
act upon the "I," the "me," and the "self." The GO represents one's reflections on the sum total 
of the "reflected appraisals" of others toward one's performances, and can be viewed as a 
generalization about the observations of the various "me's" that are performed. Mead's concept 
of GO is a fundamental theoretical concept that forms the foundation of intelligence in the 
"mind," the basis of the self-consciousness in the overall "self," and the link to social structure 
and community in "society" (Mead 1934, 2002:190-8). The GO refers to the possibility of the 
internalization of norms through the process of interaction with other members of society, and 
can be formed only in a social or virtual group. It is often the basis of morality, as the ability to 
gain a moral consciousness depends gaining the perspective of the GO (Mead, 1934). 
Mead rarely uses "the looking glass self," but it provides a basis for the GO: (1) 
imagining one's performance before another, (2) developing some understanding through 
empathy about their judgment of your performance, and (3) one's subsequent intellectual and 
emotional reaction to that judgment (Cooley, 1922:184). This alone is not the GO, but when the 
looking glass self is combined with framing others, it impregnates the self with the "social." This 
step would then lead to a full conception of the GO. 
Mead is ambiguous on multiple GOs, especially concerning race or gender. On the one 
hand, he most often mentions the GO in the singular. On the other hand, he mentions that people 
belong to family, political parties, friendship circles, nations, classes, political parties, clubs, 
corporations, and debtors/creditors as "social group(s) as a whole" (1934: 156-9). These could 
provide a basis for multiple GOs. In his 1927 lectures, Mead briefly mentions multiple GOs in 
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baseball games, public opinion and "the voice of god" (1982:145). Some theorists are highly 
critical of Mead on this ambiguity. Meltzer says that Mead "oversimplifies the concept by 
assuming ... a single universal generalized other" (1994:51). Charon (2007:77) says that Mead 
"does not always make it clear if the individual has just one generalized other or several" and 
Lewis claims that "Mead's own statements about the generalized other are not theoretically 
sophisticated enough to account for. .. complex interactions" (1979:283).2 If these statements 
have merit, then it would be incumbent on symbolic interactionists to clarify these over-
simplifications (Meltzer) so that more "complex interactions" (Lewis) can be addressed. 
While Blumer's account of the self and the GO (1969) generally follows Mead with a 
few brief mentions of the GO, but in one telling interaction, he delves deeper into this term in a 
series ofletters from 1979 to 1982. Blumer lays out six levels of the GO: (1) "abstract human 
group life" or humanity, (2) an "abstraction of the common meanings of society," (3) "the 
abstract role of one's particular segment or circle in society," ( 4) an individualized version of an 
"abstract role in society" or "one's special circle," (5) the role of participants in a "given 
concrete situation" where "the GO would shift from one situation-area to another" ( e.g., from a 
baseball game to a wedding), and (6) a "unique version of the complex of roles in a given 
situation-arena" (Blumer, 2004:117-8). He says that "the number ofGOs in a society would 
correspond to the number of different social acts in that society ... in which he was prepared to 
participate," and consequently, he saw it as "embracing large combinations of separate acts" 
(2004:126). These letters are an insight into Blumer's thoughts about multiple GOs, but he never 
published these views on his own, and many of his responses are contingent-"IfMead meant 
this, then that aspect of the GO would result." 
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Goffman' s dramaturgical approach focuses on one set of presentations of self in the front 
stage to intended audiences and another set of presentations to the back stage to fellow 
performers or supporters. His distinction between the stage and the audience leads to an 
important insight that could connect to the GO. Clearly, Goffman is thinking of two distinctly 
different "GOs," but he does not refer to the "I," the "me," or the GO. In this phase of his work, 
he is more concerned with roles and ritual theory rather than placing front stage and back stage 
into a SI framework (Collins, 1988). In Goffman's later work, he used the "frame," which could 
be connected to the GO. He develops multiple frames and mentions "anchoring" processes that 
connect an activity to the "primary frameworks of particular social groups" (1986: 247-300). In 
addition to switching frames, he allows for frame breaking, both of which keep this process from 
being deterministic (1986:3, 25-7). 
However, Goffman looks at these frames or interaction orders as somewhat episodic, not 
as how people construct multiple GOs.3 Goffman frequently said that "(m)y perspective is 
situational" (1986: 8) and this tends to crowd out the GO. Although he often refers to groups, he 
seems to avoid viewing groups and their social construction as part of one's self formation 
process. To Goffman, the ensemble of actors is necessary, but he does not analyze them as 
multiple or singular GOs. In other words, his audience is passive, perhaps too much like a theater 
audience. While focusing on the self, Goffman generally avoids the basics of SI (i.e., the I, me 
and GO) and does not generate a theory of the GO and difference. This is needed to create 
"others" and to generalize about "situations." Yet, in the end, all three theorists-Mead, Blumer 
and Goffman-are sufficiently malleable to include multiple GOs. 
Symbolic Interactionist Theories of Difference 
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For Blumer, the racial prejudice of the dominant group is a matter of the racial 
identification that one makes of one's self and others, and the way the out-group is conceived in 
relation to the dominant group. In focusing on the feelings of the dominant racial group, Blumer 
describes their beliefs in intrinsic difference, superiority, and privileges, and fears that the other 
will eliminate those privileges (Blumer, 1958, 1965; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Four points are 
important. First, group feelings point to and depend on the positional arrangement of the groups. 
This process is especially helped along by the active molding of these beliefs, privileges and 
fears by interest groups, and the whole process develops in a historical process rather than being 
created anew in each interaction. Second, the source of prejudice for Blumer specifically lies in 
the felt challenges to these dominant group feelings with: (1) affronts to feelings of group 
superiority, (2) familiarity or transgressing the boundary line of group exclusiveness, (3) 
encroachments on proprietary claims to goods or services, ( 4) challenges to power and privilege, 
and (5) direct and sometimes indirect economic competition for jobs (Blumer,1990:201). 
Prejudice becomes a defensive reaction and a protective device to each of these challenges. 
Often these situations evoke emotions of fear, and societies built upon difference often use fear 
to keep these others in their place. 
Third, the sense of difference is not created spontaneously but by interaction that is 
embedded in a history of past contacts, especially initial contact. Subsequent experiences and 
interactions may form the sense of group position in several ways, whereby it is sharpened or 
weakened. It may be deeply entrenched and resist change, or may barely take root (Blumer, 
1990: 202). However the experiences may mold the sense of group position, it is clear that the 
sense of group position formed by the dominant group defines and redefines the subordinate 
group. 
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Fourth, a sense of group position is initially molded and shaped by the elite members of 
the dominant group ( e.g., politicians in speeches, ministers in sermons, radio hosts on talk shows 
or biogs on the web). They repeat narratives that attack and question character of the subordinate 
group, and stimulate individuals to energize the dominant group. If the feelings and views are not 
internally opposed, they fuse and grow (i.e., Mead's "fusion of the I and the Me"). Thus, the 
collective image of the subordinate group and the sense of group position of the dominant group 
are established. 
However, three implications arise from the subordinate group being seen as an 
abstraction: (1) the actual definitions of the subordinate group do not derive from experiences 
with specific individuals in daily association but through transcending characterizations of the 
group as an abstract identity; (2) the definitions created in the public arena are privileged 
compared to other arenas and issues; and (3) actual subordinate experiences are subsumed to 
events or sentiments that arouse strong feelings in the dominant racial group's identification. 
Spokespersons legitimate authority by communicating in public discussions in the media. These 
elites add to interpersonal interaction, and groups conceive of themselves and others through 
collective processes, especially through the public media. It is this "sense of social position," 
emerging from public encounters, that gives race prejudice its basis. 
But spokespersons for the dominant group, who publicly characterize the subordinate 
group in a negative way, may be heeded or ignored. If ignored, they have little effect, and while 
supported by some, they may be laughed at by others (e.g., the failed religious crusade to ban 
rock-and-roll as music of the devil). On the other hand, spokespersons can fabricate powerful 
narratives that can cause riots (e.g., Tulsa in the 1920s and Detroit in the 1940s). Finally, the 
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actions that elite groups take in directing the interpretation of events are not always seen by most 
participants. 
The problem with Blumer' s "sense of group position" and Shibutani and Kwan' s similar 
concept of"group consciousness" (1965:199-223) is that it appears to be more structural than 
interactionist. It is similar to expectation states theory that sees the origin of status hierarchies 
(i.e., difference) as coming from "doubly dissimilar encounters" where one group has fewer 
resources and they also have some sort of group difference that is already identifiable. 
Knowledge of these differences "diffuse widely throughout the population and gradually take 
hold" (Ridgeway et al., 1998:334; 2009). However, this is not an especially "social 
constructionist" approach. A symbolic interactionist sense of group position should also come 
from the experiences of people in daily interaction (Blumer, 1958:6). On one occasion, Blumer 
(1965:335-36) mentions the "inner citadel of the color line" in connection to a sense of group 
position, and this suggests a back stage of "intimate and private circles" of micro-interactions, 
and a front stage of more rigid racist groupings (Esposito and Murphy, 1999:402). 
Blumer's theory needs to go a bit further to connect intersubjectivity to the sense of 
group position, and this can be done in a social constructionist way by using multiple GOs in 
creating differences between dominant and subordinate groups. Otherwise, there is an underlying . 
tension in a sense of group position exists between "the Blumer who emphasizes ongoing 
interaction among human beings" and "the Blumer who emphasizes the relationship between 
dominant and subordinate groups" (Williams and Correa, 2003 :750). In our view, multiple GOs 
are critical in the construction of difference, especially on how the sense of group position 
emerges from the mechanisms of the Meadian framework with the "I," the "me," and multiple l 
11) GOs. 
8 
f\ \ '· fi OP 
X\\~r)Ar, .· .. · I , \\ /\91: 
~J;I 
Goffinan also focuses on difference through stigma, and deference and demeanor. Stigma 
refers to three attributes that are discrediting (Goffman, 1963): (1) physical deformities, (2) weak 
character; and (3) the "tribal" stigmas of race, nation, or religion. Stigma is closely related to 
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deference and demeanor in rituals. Deference is "the appreciation an individual shows of another 
to that other" and it can be through avoidance, praise, or other actions. Demeanor is more 
indirect as it refers to behavior communicated "through deportment, dress, and bearing" 
(2005:77). These terms focus on messages coming back to an I to form a GO, though Goffinan 
does not use these terms. The third concept of "tribal stigma" proposes group difference 
especially if it can be inherited. But Goffman does not expand on "tribal stigma"-a concept of 
difference ever so close to race and gender-even though it may be inferred to as "abominations 
of the tribe" (Berbrier, 2002:556). Goffinan's front and back stages could combine with tribal 
stigma and translate into dual consciousness with multiple GOs (Smith, 2006:101-2; Williams, 
2002). But he does not pursue this lead as he concentrates on situations.4 But we contend that the 
"other" needs to be further specified through multiple and ranked GOs in an increasingly diverse 
society. 
Balancing the GO and the Self 
Interpretation of Mead's theory calls for further emphasis on the mechanisms that compel 
the "me" of the self to internalize the norms and values of various GOs and apply the evaluation 
of these GOs to difference.5 In SI, this can be done in four ways: (1) the concept of role is 
overused in SI, and in clearing the conceptual terrain, it needs to be delimited; (2) multiple GOs 
exist and they routinely create multiple selves; (3) a GO is socially constructed by each person 
through selecting and framing who is important or not, and not the result of an imposed or taken 
role, and this process of social construction involves internalization of others' views and 
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externalization or projections of one's own preferences; ( 4) GOs may be positive and negative in 
terms of being a benefit or threat towards the self, and they are most often ranked, which often 
creates difference. 
1. Role, Social and Personal GOs. The social construction of multiple GOs in SI needs 
to clarify the concept of "role." The use of role is ambiguous in three ways. First, Mead and 
Blumer use "role" in their term "taking the role of the other" which often means the empathetic 
process of "putting yourself in the place of another." This makes roles an intrinsic part of the GO 
process. Second, Mead and Goffman use "role" as a term to designate a situation rather than 
behavior conducted with fixed norms and values. This is more akin to Goffman' s reference to 
role in dramaturgical role-taking in the presentation of the self in situations. A third group of 
social psychologists (Turner, 1956, 1962; Stryker 2008, 2002; McCall and Simmons, 1966, 
1982; Burke and Stets, 2009) use the term "role" in a more formal way that refers to the norms 
and values attached to a position in society that sometimes leads to a more structural theory of 
society. 
But if all three approaches are taken, nearly all social behavior is "role behavior." For 
instance, should we study the "racist role" or "sexist role?" Further, "taking the role of the other" 
is making internal social psychological processes into role behavior. This wide and sometimes 
ambiguous use of "roles" comes close to putting the term into a reductionist position that 
identifies all social interaction as role behavior. From our approach, some social interaction 
involves roles and other interaction does not, and there is a circumscribed place for "role" as a 
position in society with clear norms and values. 
These different meanings need to be specified, which can be done by putting different 
adjectives in front of "role" or by using different terms. Social interaction begets various GOs 
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from the bottom up, and institutions and organizations can impose roles from the top down. 
Individuals perceive "concrete" or "particular others" engaging in behavior, which will be later 
described as "staging presentations of selves" through a "me." The perceptions of the behaviors 
of these concrete particular others may be grouped into a GO as with a "group GO" composed of 
a set of friends or a "situational GO" composed of an audience or group of people at a party. One 
might like to impose a role of friend or party goer on these interactions, but behaviors are so 
variegated that "role" is problematic (e.g., party-goers cannot be clearly classified into friends, 
acquaintances, or even enemies). Even using Goffman' s approach to public behavior, these 
"informal roles" are really practical experiments in "staging presentations of selves." 
On the other hand, there are social situations where roles are of great import. For 
instance, family interactions may lead to conceptions of "mother" and "father" as constructed 
roles, but these roles become more formalized in historical traditions and laws that have major 
implications about how mothers and fathers should act. Child abuse or neglect can easily land a 
parent in jail. From another perspective, organizations often formulate positions with job 
descriptions and these positions become clear roles with norms and values. The professions with 
' the concrete roles of nurse, teacher, and doctor would fit this use, especially with their codes of 
ethics and specialized training. Non-performance of such a formalized or "structured role" can 
lead to losing the "structured role" ( e.g., children can be removed from their mothers or fathers, 
workers can be fired, or professionals can lose their licenses). In these cases the socially 
constructed GOs meet the more formally constructed aspect of roles. 
Using a more nuanced view of "roles" can help define and specify encounters of the self 
and GO, and despite claims to the contrary, avoids sliding all social interaction into roles as a 
structural aspect of society (e.g., Stryker, 2002; McCall, 1970). This is very close to Fields et 
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al.' s view that "we cannot feel shame" or many other emotions "without having developed a 
generalized other" (2006:158).6 Second, in self-perception theory, these behavioral assessments 
with their feelings and attitudes may be constructed or revised after the fact rather than before by 
an active evaluation and framing of one's GO (Bern, 1972; Laird, 2007). 
2. Multiple GOs. While Mead and Blumer certainly did not emphasize multiple selves, 
William James (1983) referred to them in 1890. And even more importantly, W. E. B. Du Bois' 
concept of "double consciousness" provides a clear starting point on racial difference as African-
Americans have two different selves for white and black communities (2005). And in the last 
two decades, the concept of multiple selves has become popular (Weigert and Gecas, 2003; Beck 
et al., 2003; Thoits and Virshup, 1997; Markus and Wurf, 1989). Following SI theory, if there 
are multiple selves, there must be multiple GOs. Hence, African-Americans have white and 
black generalized others. 
The first direct reference to possible GOs comes with Shibutani's work using "reference 
groups." Robert Merton developed "multiple reference groups," positive and negative reference 
groups, and the selection of reference groups (1957: 240-50, 302-8). Shibutani (1961 :514-32; 
1955) picked up on reference groups, and after the preparatory, play and game stages, extends 
Mead's stage theory to the "reference group stage" where the interacting individual links to 
several reference groups. Society is seen as a mosaic of patterned interactions and relationships 
that are grouped by many different reference groups, each with their own "perspective." Charon 
comments that in Shibutani's approach "the individual uses several reference groups, has several 
perspectives, and interacts with a number of social worlds, and ... therefore ... the individual can 
no longer be said to have a single generalized other" (2007: 77-8, 109-14).7 However, other than 
Hewitt's mention of"reference others," Shibutani's use of"reference groups" has been avoided 
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by SI (1988). Nonetheless, Shibutani hits upon something useful that can be developed. In effect, 
these stages demonstrate the development of the GO, which Mead demonstrated with the game 
stage of understanding other roles on a baseball team. Shibutani is describing the next step with 
the say "left fielder" realizing that he or she is on one team and that they are playing a competing 
team (Mead, 1934:150-64). Instead of the "reference group stage," this could be called the 
"group difference" stage that contrasts an in- and out-group (e.g., a Red Sox batter may see a 
Yankee pitcher as a hated "other," or a Bronco linebacker may want to crush a Patriots 
quarterback). One GO reflects in-group praise for a base hit or sack, but the out-group GO reacts 
with disapproval for exactly the same act. This sports analogy can be generalized for many group 
activities from cliques in schools, the deaf, gay activists, and racial supremacists (Berbrier, 2002; 
Harris, 2009). Shibutani builds on Mead to differentiate multiple GOs (as reference groups) and 
add to Mead's stage theory (the reference group stage). 
Stryker sees a similar situation coming out of social networks that are intersected by 
cross-cutting boundaries of class, ethnicity, age, gender, and religion. People live their lives in 
relatively small social networks (Stryker and Burke 2000). This structural SI perspective delimits 
the boundaries of all these social networks, which block or permit the individuals' access to 
people in networks. For instance, racial social structures would block an African-American in the 
1950s from the social networks leading to good jobs and elite clubs. Individuals continually have 
to adjust their identities and emotions depending on the norms of the network. And if a good fit 
is lacking, the individual may wither in neglect and eventually leave (Stryker, 2002; Fine, 1990). 
While Stryker does not develop the concept of the GO, his concept of cross-cutting boundaries 
and "small and specialized networks" suggest multiple GOs. 
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3. Selecting, Shaping and Framing. An adequate view of multiple GOs need concepts 
with to perceive multiple GOs from ones social networks (i.e., networks are not automatically 
homogenous). The self is not passive toward its GOs as it actively frames and shapes them. Each 
person only takes some of what they see from reflected appraisals and ignores other feedback 
(Kinch, 1963; Lundgren, 2004). Thus, a "selective reinforcement" process that is clearly not 
deterministic exists between self and "significant and generalized others" (Yeung and Martin 
2003: 844; Quarantelli and Cooper, 1967; Miyamoto and Dornbusch, 1956). When the young are 
malleable during primary socialization, "internalization" may be the most important result of the 
messages coming from multiple GOs. During adolescence teenagers often rebel against a 
familial GO (e.g., parents, kin and teachers), and construct new or modified selves as peer groups 
dominate (e.g., "goths," "hoods" or "nerds"). As one's sense of self becomes firmer, people often 
engage more in "externalization" as they try to impose their "selves" and the way the GO should 
interpret them and others (e.g., be "a good soldier," "bad-assed gang members," or "professional 
doctors") (Yeung and Martin, 2003 :846). Identification others are important for solidarity since 
"they are like me" or "they are like what I want to be"; and valuation others that consist of others 
who pass judgments on you, often negatively ( e.g., gangs, juries, ethnic or racial groups, etc.) 
(Turner and Stets, 2004; Turner, 1988, Turner, 1956). 
Building on Turner and Stets (2004) and Schwalbe et al. (2000) in table 1, these 
processes correspond to internalization and externalization as they occur in a number of ways. 
**********Table 1 here*********** 
First, groups of higher status people, especially those with merit-based talents and forceful 
personalities, internalize their legitimacy and often externalize their evaluations of others-"self-
justified othering"-often accompanied by "powerful virtual selves" (see Table 1, 1 +2+3) to 
14 
which low status subordinates may respond with "accepted others" or "defensive othering" (table 
11 + 12 and 14+ 15) (Schwalbe et al., 2000:422-9; West and Fenstermaker, 2002:146-63).8 
Protected high status people, owing their position to ascription ( e.g., family or inherited 
positions), do the same but with less legitimacy (5+6 and 8+9) and they are also subject to the 
higher status persons' externalization. They form their own internalization that is short of 
"powerful virtual selves" as some are weak links or wastrels who try to manipulate their 
situations with lower status persons. 
Second, with the groups of low status persons attributions of deference and subordination 
respond to externalization with accepted and defensive othering, and the internalization of the 
views of generalized others (in table 1, rows 4+5+6 and 7+8+9). They are often subjected to 
high status persons with less legitimacy often engage in defensive and oppressive othering that 
subordinates may not really accept but they accord them some deference. 
Third, when encountering externalization or valuation, lower status people create or 
modify their own group's GOs through internalization. Usually these are positive evaluations but 
when confronted with negative imposed GOs, they often modify their GOs, and may create new 
subcultures. DuBois' "dual consciousness" is a good example of this (12, 15 and 18 in table 1). 
Each GO then leads to the construction of specific and multiple selves, but clearly, the GO plays 
a role in creating or modifying that self. Selves may internalize the view of critical GOs and 
accept imposed evaluations as with the internalization oflabeling theory or Garfinkel' s 
degradation ceremony (1967). For instance, shame may occur when one views life from the eyes 
of the GO and realizes that others see one's "base motives" rather than one's "glowing self-
image," and embarrassment may occur when one takes of the role of the GO and realizes that 
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one has "bungled a presentation of self' (Shott, 1979:1325). And if serious enough, this GO may 
be carried from one interaction to another. 
Fourth, while this construction benefits from many of the terms used by Schwalbe et al. 
(2000), table 1 also includes the rows 7+8+9 and 16+ 17+ 18 that indicate processes that involve 
some resistance or countering of the dominant processes of inequality. Not all lower ranked high 
status and lower status persons accept "oppressive others" as some are protesters who engage in 
resistance and "counter-othering" (e.g., Malcolm X's re-visioning of white behaviors). These 
actions may range from minor slowdowns to outright rebellions with many gradations in 
between. Thus, GOs have a combined and interactive process of "assertion and assignment" 
(Berbrier quoting Cornell, 2008 :4 79) with externalization through framed, shaped and selected 
others, and internalization by imposed groups, behaviors and structures. 
4. Positive and Negative GOs are Ranked. GOs have a relationship between each other 
and often have positive and negative characteristics (Perinbanayagam, 1975:514-5; Lawler et al., 
2008:523; Crouch, 1958). Some GOs are more intrinsic to the construction of the self and are 
highly internalized, while others may be minor. Other GOs are disputed and resisted. For 
instance, African-Americans with a dual consciousness have one GO composed of fellow 
African-Americans and many of them in this GO have a favorable viewpoint of each other. They 
may also have a white oppositional GO that they negatively internalize and actively resist. Both 
have an effect, but it is clear that GOs are not always positive, and that the existence of negative 
GOs are the clear indicators of difference, whether it is based on race, class and gender, or any 
other aspect of life (e.g., teams, in-crowds, gamblers, religions, etc.). Thus, the others' actual 
assessments of a person do not lead deterministically to one or another GO (Yeung and Martin, 
2003; Ichiyama, 1993; Felson, 1985, 1993, and counter Archer, 2003). Shibutani's master 
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processes of ethnic relations are at work in these positive and negative evaluations (1970). 
Differentiating processes occur with stable relations of inequality, but they are often brought 
about by more disjunctive processes coming out of protest and conflict. Sustaining processes 
involve mutual support in stable and homogenous social worlds, and they are brought about by 
integrative processes whereby groups become identified as similar (Shibutani, 1970; Wacker, 
1995). 
Negative and positive appraisals imply a ranking that is "ordered into a hierarchy of 
relevancies" (Lewis, 1979: 284). Burke goes further on the "self-verification" among identities 
and comes close to multiple GOs in his "general principles" where he mentions multiple 
identities that are compared (2003 :203). Although Burke focuses more on identity and only 
implies a GO, his focus is analogous to ours, as we could nearly replace identity and "reflected 
appraisals" with a combination of selves and GOs. 
In evaluating how much influence two GOs might have, a process similar to differential 
association theory operates whereby the "I'' evaluates two different groups in terms of an 
accumulation of definitions, values, or positions that one has in common with one group or the 
other (Title, Burke and Jackson, 1986; Akers and Jensen, 2006). However, the exact mechanisms 
of ranking in terms of the GO's importance to the self may be conscious or unconscious 
(Quillian, 2008). Ranking is done partly on the basis of comfort level of emotions, but also on 
the basis of aspirations for social and cultural capital as in interaction ritual chains~one may 
admire a group of people with whom they currently feel very uncomfortable (Collins, 1988, 
2004). In this sense, two networks and thett values are weighed both rationally and emotionally 
in terms of positive and negative experiences. The relative weights of these experiences will shift 
one toward one or the other GO, but third or fourth GOs may also exist. For instance, one may 
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decide between the upwardly mobile GO does not accept you, and the poor neighborhood GO 
who does. But a kin group that is strongly in favor of upward mobility may turn the tide toward 
the upwardly mobile GO in forming the self. 
Changes or disturbances in the feedback coming from a GO can lead to changes in self-
identity. Laub finds that "turning points were critical to understanding processes of change" for 
criminals, and that these turning points away from crime tended to come from 'job stability and 
marital attachment in adulthood" (2006:243). More generally, Burke (2006:85, 94) finds three 
reasons for identity changes which we can mold process of the GO: (a) persistent discrepancies 
in feedback from a GO leading to slow change, (b) multiple identities may be activated together, 
but their verifications invoke opposing meanings leading to erratic change, and ( c) catastrophic 
events that wholly impose new GOs and identities. 
Further, a coalition theory of GOs would supplement the balance of positive and negative 
experiences (e.g., differential association theory). Thus, primary group GOs based on family, 
school and peer groups might combine with work, religious, political, friendship, recreational, 
voluntary and other GOs. In some ways, a cross-pressure theory of social constructed GOs could 
be developed. But GOs need not always be ranked when people see themselves in equally valued 
groups. For instance, one might equally value GOs based on church members, golf buddies, and 
neighbors. GOs may simply exist in their own co-equal and valued spheres, but it is when some 
are negative and ranked below other GOs that they assume importance in constructing 
difference.9 
Modeling Selves and GOs 
The processes outlined here of multiple selves, me's and GOs are shown in Figure 1. 
**********Figure 1 here*********** 
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The basic model shows how a self can monitor situations (1 and 2) and the "I" (3), and then it 
presents various "me's" (5) through staging (4) in social interaction situations (8). The self 
collects the reactions of the others in social interaction by constructing GOs ( 6 and 7), which are 
then fed back into the self and the "I." Through socialization, individuals may have a number of 
GOs (e.g., my family, people at work, whites and blacks, etc.). While Goffinan's staging and the 
presentation of self are not elaborated here, the framing that goes on concerning the multiple 
GOs in item 6 of figure 1 is examined more closely. "Selecting" places the people who fit into 
one's various GOs and it also involves a sense that one knows how others think about these 
groupings. More internalized "framing" involves the social organization of those people 
concerning situations, emotions, values, and norms that make this GO somewhat coherent and 
worthy of being recognized. "Ranking" involves seeing each GO as positive, negative, or 
neutral, and assessing this GO's importance to the individual's self. While ranking may be 
intense due to positive and negative aspects of difference, ranking may also be of lesser 
importance for people whose lives are less contested. The different GOs are the sum of (a) one's 
impression of their own staged and framed performances before others (3->4->S->8 in figure 1, 
(b) one's selecting, shaping and ranking of the judgments and emotional reactions involving 
these GOs (7->6), and (c) one's estimate of the others' judgments or reactions (8->7). 
Regarding difference, an individual may feel either high or low rank (to make it simple), 
and those status rankings are associated with various positive or negative emotions resulting in 
GOs being validated, questioned or rejected. Various selves are then constructed or reconstructed 
based on the feedback generated by a number of GOs. It is important to note that these GOs are 
framed or constructed themselves. Individuals can choose to ignore people as inconsequential, 
biased, or programmed; however, some people in coercive situations carmot be overlooked ( e.g., 
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prisoners cannot ignore guards without consequences). This is how the GO differs from roles. 
Organizations and social interaction of others create roles, but the GO is based on those persons 
whom the individual recognizes as being important enough to monitor, select, and shape. One 
can even operate in the interstices of roles. The components of the GO need not always be direct 
contacts. They can also consist of indirect contacts who may comment on their presentations of 
self-made to others ( e.g., reading a racist blog on-line from a person one may never meet). Thus, 
GOs have a connection with direct interaction through the looking glass self, and also an indirect 
connection without interaction with the generalized group. But they do not include everyone in 
the community, as is sometimes implied by Mead. 
The importance of multiple and somewhat specific GOs is that researchers should pay 
much more attention to how people frame the others to whom they attend, and also pay attention 
to those whom they might ignore. This would also involve the differences between "perceived 
GOs" (what you think the GO sees) and "actual GOs" (what the others actually see) (Quarantelli 
and Cooper, 1967:296). The easiest way to identify a GO is when a person refers to "we," "us", 
"them," or "those people," and the plural "you" (Wiley, 1994; Dunn, 1998). One most often 
constructs "we's" or "they's" at work, in one's social life, and in one's family and neighborhood. 
The key to finding "multiple GOs" and in the process finding "multiple selves" is to locate who 
might be in the GO being discussed. This is socially constructed "sense of group position," not 
imposing a role or group position (Turner, 1956; Turner, 1988; Stryker and Burke, 2000; Stryker, 
2002). This would benefit by more attention to social network data for each GO and attention to 
who knows whom in these networks since the transmissibility of norms and behaviors may be 
dependent on the density of these networks. 
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Difference emerges from this model from two directions: (I) it is socially constructed by 
the GO in many different encounters (internalization), and (2) it is socially imposed from the 
group level often in a historical context ( externalization). The first approach fuses the processes 
of multiple GOs with expectations states theory. It looks at the encounters, interactions, and 
exchanges of people in groups to create a sense of difference. The difference then follows the 
tenets of "a sense of group position" especially with groups developing and promoting their 
interests based on this difference. The second approach takes a "larger sense of group position" 
as already established with individuals and smaller groups contextualized in these situations. 
However, it must be recognized that this "sense of group position" must be accepted by 
individuals and it is not automatic. People may not be aware of other's warnings of "group 
position" or don't believe them. Social construction emerges again as each person tests their 
apparent 'group position,' and if rebuffed by the other group, are more inclined to recognize it. 
However, this testing does not occur continuously and some people simply accept their "sense of 
group position," sometimes even when contrary interactions are present. 
Using "individual" and "overall" GOs (Dodds et al., 1997), the creation of a larger "sense 
of group position" or difference would be the movement from a number of specific GOs at work, 
at school, in the neighborhood, and on the street to a more abstract GO that focuses on strangers 
categorized into large categories. This "meta-GO" then becomes an overarching marker of 
difference in social interaction, and it then gets built up into a structural feature of society. With 
evidence from specific interactions gathered into GOs, the "meta-GO" as "a sense of group 
position" becomes a guide to behavior where individual interactions are no longer relevant. 
Conclusion 
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Multiple GOs have not been systematically applied in SI analyses of inequality and 
difference. For instance, an entire issue of Symbolic Interaction (Anderson and Snow, 2001) that 
was devoted to inequality only mentions the "GO" once, and "others evaluations," "othering" 
and "reflected appraisals" briefly appear. The intent of this paper is to emphasize multiple GOs 
with ranking processes similar to W. E. B. DuBois concept of dual consciousness. A key to 
making future SI analyses more specific is to integrate and develop the GO into multiple GOs, 
which match multiple selves, and show how they develop together. From there, the selfs 
conceptions of difference using multiple GOs can delineate friends from acquaintances to 
opposing religious, gender, class or racial groups. 
Three points about the GO are especially important. First, the re-conceptualized GO is 
multiple, which leads to multiple selves and provides the basis for socially constructed difference 
through Blumer' s sense of group position. Multiple GOs are socially constructed through 
framing involving internalization and/or externalization. And finally, GOs most often are ranked 
in terms of importance to the self. Second, as difference emerges from these ranked GOs, selves 
form a sense of group position when intersubjective GOs overlap a great deal between people 
through the intersections of their social constructions. Both "identification" and "valuation" GOs 
can overlap. Thus, the creation and ranking of multiple GOs demonstrates the social construction 
of a sense of group position, which seems to be missing in traditional SI accounts. And third, the 
framing of GOs needs to be more developed. In the three part theory of framing the GO 
presented here, "selecting" concerns the choice of persons to be in one's various GOs, "shaping" 
is the ideational content that puts these people together through situations or ideas, and "ranking" 
looks at how they see some GOs being more important than others. Further research in this area 
would bring out all three of these processes. 
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In the continuing effort to refine theories of difference and inequality, this paper has 
added to SI approach involving the construction of multiple GOs in identifying differences, 
groups, and categories that are so important for peoples' lives in society. While we are not 
providing a complete theory of difference, we are emphasizing the construction of a larger theory 
with the use of multiple and ranked GOs. 
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Table 1: Constructions of Generalized Others (GO) based on Self-Perceptions 
Attributions of inequality Externalization toward others Internalization toward one's self 
to persons of higMow rank due to generalized others due to generalized others 
]-Merit-based status: 2-Self--justified othering: 3-Powerful virtual selves: 
Persons of high rank Validated rank of GO Positive GO based on confidence 
with talent, ability or compared to others with and positive emotions (with 
even entitlement. pride, satisfaction, or arrogance. infrequent conversions to the 
other side with an alternate GO). 
High 4-Ascription: 5-Defensive othering: 6-Defensive internalization: 
Status Persons of high rank Ambivalence and uneasiness Positive GO and self based on 
due to ascription, family about own rank compared ambivalent status with some 
or luck. to lower GO. defensive emotions. 
7-Protected status: 8-Oppressive othering: 9-Manipulative internalization: 
Persons of high rank due to Fear of losing high rank with GO based on active repression 
bias and discrimination guilt, anger and rectitude ofothers. 
. against others. about own and lower GO . 
10-Deferential status: I I-Accepted othering: 12-Creating negative sub-cultures: 
Persons of low rank due to Acceptance of imposed Negative GO based on deference 
lack of ability or talent and superior GO based on and respect for authority, and 
(personal or group). deference & shame. low self esteem often involving 
deviance and dropping out. 
Low 13-Group Subordination: 14-Defensive othering: 15-Adaptational othering: 
Status Low rank due to fate, Acceptance of superior GO GO and self based on trading 
ascription, or chance. but ambivalence and anxiety power for patronage or forming 
about imposed GO. sub-cultures. 
16-Discrimination: 17-Counter-othering: 18-Creating positive sub-cultures: 
Low rank due to the Angry rejection of imposed GO based on active resistance 
discrimination and bias GO and construction of and re-interpretation of ones 
of others. positive alternative GO. own group. 
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Endnotes: 
1 While many scholars read Mead in a number of ways (as they do for any theorist), Mead could 
have used the GO as a more central part of his theory. Our purpose here is to show how the GO 
has been de-emphasized in SI (perhaps unintentionally) and how it can be reinforced as a more 
central concept. 
2 Da Silva (2007: 50-51, 59-61) makes a brief note of multiple generalized others in his 
introduction to Mead, and Aboulafia (2001, 2010) refers to multiple generalized others. Archer 
(2012: 96-97) refers to the "internal conversation," which can be interpreted as going on between 
multiple selves and possibly multiple generalized others in a "relational reflexivity." Gergen 
(2009:134-150) makes strong references to multi-being and inner dialogues, which are based on 
a relational being. However, Gergen only makes very brief mention of Mead and Blumer, and 
does not use the SI terms like the generalized other. While one can find references to multiple 
GOs in this literature, it is not linked very much to the further study of difference. 
3 From this point on, we use "framing" in a somewhat different way from Goffman. It refers to 
schemata that is a process that shapes groups or network contacts. 
4 Collins (2004 and elsewhere) makes a persuasive argument that Goffinan is Durkheimian rather 
than an interactionist. However, many SI theorists like Scheff (2006) would disagree. In a paper 
in preparation, we apply generalized others to further delineate Blumer' s concept of race as a 
sense of group position making major use of Goffman' s concepts of front and .back stage. 
5 Recent efforts in Europe have been made to bring other theories to SI. Burr (2009) fuses 
Mead's I and Me, and Bakhtin's "I-for-myself' and "I-for-the-other" (2009:325-6). She also 
recognizes three levels of the generalized other (people in general, specific groups, and specific 
others), which is closer to our position (2009:335). However, Burr does not recognize positive, 
negative, and ranked generalized others. Holdsworth and Morgan (2007) re-emphasize a fluid 
GO but still view it as singular. Archer (2003, 2010) finds the GO too deterministic and she uses 
reflexivity along with Bourdieu' s habitus. 
6 Burke and Stets mention the GO only once (2009:20) and differentiate identities on the basis of 
"role, group, and person" (2009:114). But their concept of"reflected appraisals" is similar to the 
GO. 
7 According to Charon (1985: 164), Shibutani calls society a "reference group," takes the GO as 
a "perspective", uses "several reference groups," and constructs one GO constructed from 
multiple perspectives. 
8 This table draws on Turner and Stets (2004) and Schwalbe et al. (2000) (especially items 3, 6 
and 14). Schwalbe et al.'s (2000) negotiated order perspective is particularly useful, but our use 
of "other" differs from their definition as "the process whereby a dominant group defines into 
existence an inferior group" (2000:422) using "oppressive othering, subordinate adaptation, 
boundary maintenance, and emotional management." Their approach is top-down, while ours is 
bottom up (2000:421). Hence, Schwalbe and colleagues use more ofan externalization approach. 
To some degree, the contribution of this paper is to complement their approach by adding a more 
theoretical dimension that specifies the internal mechanisms of the GO and "the me" to make 
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"othering" a deeper and more complex process that is both external and internal, and active and 
re-active. 
9 GO processes need to retain a sense of complex interactions in front and back stage. For 
instance, racial groupings may be strongly influenced by polarizing leaders and in front stage it 
may be hazardous to express your more complex position based on actual experiences. 
Backstage and in Blumer' s "inner citadel" of intersubj ectivity each person involved may have a 
more complex interaction that they discuss privately and often act upon. For instance, some 
blacks may have white friends and "act white" according to others who might not. Or whites 
may similarly be criticized for being an "other lover" (insert hated group for 'other') or "race 
traitor." Maines' (1999) discussion of information pools for blacks and whites in which the 
"inner citadel" discussions take place is analogous to our use of generalized others and networks. 
Further, sanctions that groups may impose from front to back stage in individuals are important. 
The creation of integrative leaders to counteract polarizing leaders is essential. The Serbian-
Bosnian genocide where a seemingly integrated group became very polarized into two warring 
groups would be fertile ground for seeing how this process might work. 
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